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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting suppression of 
results of a blood draw. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Dennis John Halseth with burglary, grand theft, eluding, 
DUI, and leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., pp. 38-41, 64-67.) Halseth 
moved to suppress evidence resulting from a "warrantless blood draw." (R., pp. 
72-73,78-89.) The state opposed the motion (R., pp. 103-12), which proceeded 
to hearing (see generally Tr.). The district court granted the motion,1 concluding 
it would be "antithetical" to the Supreme Court of the United States' holding that 
there is not a per se exigency allowing blood draws for BAC blood testing to hold 
that implied consent allows for blood draws for testing. (R., pp. 119-26.) The 
state filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 150-53.) 
1 The district court did not make any factual findings on Halseth's allegation that 
he refused the test. (R., p. 121 (noting that Halseth alleged he verbally refused 
to allow a blood draw).) The district court ultimately granted the motion on the 
bases that the search was conducted without a search warrant and the state 




Did the district court err when it concluded that because the blood draw in 
this case was not justified by one exception to the warrant requirement 




The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Implied Consent Exception 
Does Not Apply In This Case Because The Exigency Exception Does Not Apply 
In This Case 
Introduction 
The district court first noted that in Missouri v. McNeely, _ U.S. _, 133 
S.Ct. 1552 (2013), the Supreme Court of the United States had concluded that 
there was no per se exigency, allowing a blood draw for BAC testing, created by 
the body's natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood, and therefore a warrant 
had to be acquired for the search unless an exigency was shown to exist in the 
case. (R., pp. 123-24.) Interpreting McNeely as holding that exigent 
circumstances must be shown to justify any warrantless blood draw, the district 
court held that because "the blood draw was not justified by exigent 
circumstances" it "violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely." (R., pp. 123-26.) The district 
court's determination that McNeely eliminated the implied consent exception is 
erroneous, and therefore the district court's suppression order should be 
reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a 
suppression motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly 
erroneous, but the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 
(2009). 
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C. The District Court Erred By Concluding That Consent To BAC Testing By 
Blood Draw May Not Be Implied By Law 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
I 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) Consent is such an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied 
consent statute. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 
(2007). 
In its analysis the district court concluded that the McNeely decision by the 
Supreme Court of the United States contains the "announcement that, absent 
exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment mandates that an qfficer obtain a 
warrant prior to conducting a blood draw," and therefore the state could not justify 
a warrantless blood draw absent exigent circumstances "by simply arguing 
implied consent." (R., p. 7.) By holding that implied consent is not a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement, the district court erred. 
This Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent circumstances are 
different exceptions to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 
P .3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable exception here; 
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement."). The 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this as well in McNeely. In that 
4 
case the only question before the Court was "whether the natural metabolization 
of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual 
blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. The Court 
held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on 
the totality of the circumstances." Id. Thus, the issue was limited to 
"nonconsensual blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited to 
the exigent circumstances exception. Moreover, in addressing whether a case-
by-case analysis under the exigency exception would "undermine the 
governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses," the 
Court specifically stated that states would still "have a broad range of legal tools 
to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without 
undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent 
laws." kL. at 1565-66. Far from holding that the state may not legally imply 
consent by a motorist, the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws.2 
Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement, and such 
exception may be implied by law. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302.;03, 160 P.3d at 741-
42. This exception applies regardless of the applicability of the exigency 
exception. kL.; see also State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,712-13, 184 P.3d 215, 
2 The district court also concluded that the state's argument that "protest to a 
blood draw does not negate the implied consent" was "contradictory to a 
reasonable interpretation of the implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002." (R., p. 
125.) Idaho appellate courts "have long held that a driver has no legal right to 
resist or refuse evidentiary testing." State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 909, 243 
P.3d 1093, 1097 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing cases back to 1989). The district court 
lacked authority to overrule the interpretation of the implied consent statute by 
Idaho appellate courts and was not at liberty to ignore that binding precedent. 
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218-1 9 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Even if the exigent circumstances exception was 
inapplicable, the blood draw was valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent."). 
The district court's conclusion that implied consent is not a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, and therefore the state must show exigency, is erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests that the district court's order suppressing the evidence 
obtained by the blood draw be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings. 
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